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COMMENT

EMPTY CREDITOR SYNDROME AND
VIVISEPULTURE: PREVENTING
CREDIT-DEFAULT-SWAP HOLDERS
FROM PUSHING COMPANIES INTO
PREMATURE GRAVES BY REFUSING TO
NEGOTIATE RESTRUCTURINGS
INTRODUCTION
Our financial industry faced nearly unparalleled distress in 2008.1
Numerous banking and insurance institutions whose names were
synonymous with the triumph of American capitalism—e.g., Lehman
Brothers2 and AIG3—either filed for bankruptcy or were bailed out by

1 See Magnifico, USA Was 3 hrs Away from Economic, Political Collapse in September
2008, DAILY KOS (Feb. 9, 2009, 8:58 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2009/02/09/695504/USA-was-3-hrs-away-from-Economic,-Political-Collapse-in-September-2008?detail=hide
(“According to Rep. Paul Kanjorski (D) (PA–11), in mid-September of 2008, the United States
of America came just three hours away from the collapse of the entire economy. In a span of 2
hours, $550 billion was drawn out of money market accounts in an electronic run on the
banks.”).
2 See CNBC with Wires, Lehman Brothers Files For Bankruptcy, Scrambles to Sell Key
Business,
CNBC
(Sept.
15,
2008),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/26708143/Lehman_Brothers_Files_For_Bankruptcy_Scrambles_to_Sel
l_Key_Business (discussing the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy).
3 Matthew Karnitschnig, Deborah Solomon, Liam Pleven, & Jon E. Hilsenrath, U.S. to
Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL ST.
JOURNAL at A1 (Sept. 16, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122156561931242905.html
(discussing the federal government’s bailout of AIG).
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the federal government to prevent their failure. Meanwhile,
competitors bought out other stalwarts facing potential bankruptcies.4
In 2012, the distress has not entirely subsided, and the financial
industry continues to recover.5 More troubling, however, is the effect
the financial industry’s collapse has had on the broader economy.6
Between January 2008 and February 2010, the United States lost 8.8
million jobs.7 Simultaneously, the unemployment rate ballooned from
roughly five percent to nearly ten percent.8 Unsurprisingly, business
bankruptcies increased throughout the country over a similar
timeframe.9

4 JP Morgan Chase bought Bear Stearns, see Andrew Ross Sorkin, JP Morgan Pays $2 a
Share for Bear Stearns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2008, at A1, available at ,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/17/business/17bear.html, and Washington Mutual, see Robin
Sidel, David Enrich, & Dan Fitzpatrick, WaMu Is Seized, Sold off to J.P. Morgan, in Largest
Failure in U.S. Banking History, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008, at A1, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122238415586576687.html, while Bank of America bought
Meryl Lynch. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill Sold, N.Y.
TIMES,
Sept.
14,
2008,
at
A1,
available
at,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/15lehman.html (discussing the sale of Merrill
Lynch and the pending bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers).
5 See, e.g., Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (The) (GS), YAHOO! FINANCE (Feb. 13, 2012,
7:59
PM),
http://finance.yahoo.com/echarts?s=GS+Interactive#chart1:symbol=gs;range=5y;indicator=volu
me;charttype=line;crosshair=on;ohlcvalues=0;logscale=on;source=undefined (Goldman Sachs’
stock traded at more than $230.00 per share in October 2008, while in February 2012 it has
traded around $120.00 per share); Bank of America Corporation Com (BAC), YAHOO! FINANCE
(Feb.
13,
2012,
7:59
PM),
http://finance.yahoo.com/echarts?s=BAC+Interactive#chart1:symbol=bac;range=5y;indicator=v
olume;charttype=line;crosshair=on;ohlcvalues=0;logscale=on;source=undefined
(Bank
of
America Corporation’s stock went from more than $50.00 per share to under $10.00 over the
same time period); Citigroup, Inc. Common Stock (C), YAHOO! FINANCE (Feb. 13, 2012, 7:59
PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/echarts?s=C+Interactive#symbol=C;range=5y (Citigroup’s stock
went from roughly $140.00 per share to about $35.00 per share over the same time period).
6 See Howard Wial, Siddharth Kulkarni, & Richard Shearer, MetroMonitor: Tracking
Economic Recession and Recovery in America’s 100 Largest Metropolitan Areas,
METROPOLITAN POLICY PROGRAM AT THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/Metro/metro_monitor/2011_12_metro_moni
tor/1215_metro_monitor.pdf (discussing the general economic impact).
7 Annalyn Cenky, Will Obama Break Even on Jobs?, CNN MONEY (Jan. 11, 2012, 8:44
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/11/news/economy/obama_jobs_record/index.htm.
8 Unemployment Rate – Not Seasonally Adjusted, GOOGLE: PUBLIC DATA (Feb. 10,
2012),
http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=z1ebjpgk2654c1_&met_y=unemployment_rate
&idim=country:US&fdim_y=seasonality:S&dl=en&hl=en&q=unemployment+statistics#!ctype
=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=unemployment_rate&fdim_y=seasonality:U&scale_
y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=country&idim=country:US&ifdim=country&tstart=1200200400000
&tend=1268456400000&hl=en&dl=en.
9 In 2007, there were 28,332 business bankruptcy filings, while in 2008–2010, there were
43,546; 60,837; and 56,282 respectively. Annual Business and Non-business Filings by Year
(1980–2011), AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE (last visited Feb. 13, 2012, 10:38 PM),
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=63164&TEM
PLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm.
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Many pundits have argued that a “housing bubble” caused this
collapse.10 Academic research offers the same conclusion but with
additional insight into why and how the decline of property values
could lead to catastrophic results for the broader economy.11 One of
the more nuanced observations points to the role of complex financial
instruments in exacerbating the economic decline.12 This observation
led government officials to enact regulations that could prevent this
economic chaos from reoccurring.13 The result was the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”).14
Dodd-Frank’s drafters focused, in part, on the regulation of
sophisticated financial instruments because of their direct relationship
to the turmoil.15 One such financial instrument was the credit default
swap.16
A credit default swap is a contract under which the seller agrees to
pay the purchaser if a negative event befalls a debt instrument; in
return, the purchaser agrees to pay the seller a percentage of the
payout either up front or over time.17 Credit default swaps played an
integral role in the system-wide collapse of the financial markets,18 as
10 See, e.g., Alan Greenspan, The Fed Didn’t Cause the Housing Bubble, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 11, 2009, at A15, available at, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123672965066989281.html.
(discussing the housing bubble and its potential origins); Steven Gjerstad and Vernon L. Smith,
From Bubble to Depression?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2009, at A15, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123897612802791281.html (discussing historical bubbles,
including the housing bubble). But see Casey B. Mulligan, Was it Really a Bubble?, ECONOMIX
(May 5, 2010, 2:53 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/05/what-it-really-abubble/ (questioning whether a bubble actually existed and arguing the housing bubble was a
response to market fundamentals).
11 See, e.g., Robert Hatch, Reforming the Murky Depths of Wall Street: Putting the
Spotlight on Security and Exchange Commission’s Regulatory Proposal Concerning Dark Pools
of Liquidity, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1032, 1040 (2010) (discussing the development and impact
of dark liquidity trading); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Saving the Global Financial System:
International Financial Reforms and United States Financial Reform, Will They Do The Job?,
43 NO. 1 UCC L. J. ART. 3, 4 (2010) (discussing the causes of the financial crises).
12 See, e.g., MICHAEL M. LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE 62
(2011) (discussing, generally, the role of derivatives in the financial turmoil).
13 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which Congress
passed in 2009, claims “[t]o provide for financial regulatory reform, to protect consumers and
investors . . .” H.R. 4173, 111th Con. (1st Sess. 2010).
14 Id.
15 See id. (Dodd-Frank also aims “to regulate the over-the-counter derivatives market”).
16 Id.
17 For an in-depth discussion of credit default swaps, see infra Part I.A.
18 See Yves Smith, So Why Hasn’t the Credit Default Swap Casino Been Shut Down,
NAKED CAPITALISM (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2010/03/so-why-hasntthe-credit-default-swaps-casino-been-shut-down.html (“Credit default swaps played a much
more central role in the financial crisis than is widely understood.”); Jessie Westbrook & David
Scheer, Credit Swaps Must Be Regulated Now, SEC’s Cox Says (Update4), BLOOMBERG (Sept.
23,
2008,
5:03
PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ajXNMd45_cio (“U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission Chairman Christopher Cox said Congress should ‘immediately’
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they tied the fate of large amounts of capital to shaky debt
instruments and intertwined the risks of massive financial
institutions.19
Although Dodd-Frank’s regulation of credit default swaps may
succeed in stemming some of the systemic risk that these derivative
financial instruments create, the statute does not prevent creditdefault-swap holders from forcing companies into bankruptcies that
otherwise would not occur. Specifically, under current law, parties
who invest in a company’s debt and who have also purchased a credit
default swap on that investment have incentive to resist that
company’s attempts to restructure its debt in order to avoid
bankruptcy, even when a restructuring would be beneficial to other
creditors and the economy at large. In an effort to rectify this
inefficient outcome, this Comment proposes a rule that Congress
should adopt to improve the efficacy of its credit-default-swap
regulation.
First, this Comment outlines the basics of the credit default swap,
discusses the relationship between the credit-default-swap market and
the financial crisis of 2008, and describes the way Dodd-Frank
addresses the systemic problems that credit default swaps cause.
Next, it explains that Congress’s pre- and post-Dodd-Frank regulation
of credit default swaps has already led to bankruptcies that otherwise
would not have occurred and will continue to do so. Finally, it
proposes a rule that solves this problem: Congress should allow the
seller of a credit default swap to refuse to make a payout to a
purchaser that does not negotiate a restructuring with the debt issuer
underlying the swap.
I.

CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS: THE BASICS
A. What Is a Credit Default Swap?

Conceived in the aftermath of Drexel Burnham Lambert’s20
creation of collateralized debt obligations21 in the late 1980s,22 a

grant authority to regulate credit-default swaps amid concern the bets are fueling the global
financial crisis.”).
Also, consider the role that credit default swaps may have or are having in economies
throughout the world. See, e.g., Abigail Moses, Credit Default Swaps on Greek, Portuguese
Government
Bonds
Jump
to
Records,
BLOOMBERG
(Apr.
26,
2011,
4:50 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-26/credit-default-swaps-on-greekportuguese-government-bonds-jump-to-records.html.
19 See infra Part I.C.
20 Ironically, this investment firm filed for bankruptcy in 1990. Kurt Eichenwald, THE
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credit default swap is a “promise[ ] to make a specified payment in
the event a particular debt instrument experiences an event of default,
such as a payment default or if the issuer files for bankruptcy
protection.”23 In other words, credit default swaps are “derivative
instruments that seek to mitigate the risk of failure of a security
through purchase of insurance against the occurrence of such
event.”24 For example, suppose Sara purchases Company X’s bonds
but is worried that X may be unable to repay her according to the
terms of her investment. She could turn to a third party who, for a
price, will guarantee her a return by agreeing to pay her if X fails to
do so.25 The contract between Sara and the third party is a credit
default swap.
To purchase a credit default swap, the buyer makes “a single
upfront payment, or possibly a series of payments, in exchange for the
counterparty’s obligation to make . . . [a] payment that is contingent
upon the occurrence of any one of a specified set of possible credit
events.”26 In this way, the instruments are similar to insurance
systems we have in society.27 Consider Ben’s purchase of car
insurance against the possibility of damage or theft. Ben pays the
insurance company a monthly payment, and the insurance company
assumes the risk of catastrophic damage to the car by promising to
pay Ben if such a catastrophic event occurs. When the buyer of a

COLLAPSE OF DREXEL BURNHAM LAMBERT; Drexel, Symbol of Wall St. Era, is
Dismantling; Bankruptcy Filed, N.Y. TIMES: ARCHIVES, Feb. 14, 1990, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/14/business/collapse-drexel-burnham-lambert-drexel-symbolwall-st-era-dismantling-bankruptcy.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
21 “Collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs, are created by banks that pool together
otherwise unrelated debt-instruments, like bonds, and then sell shares of that pool to investors.”
Collateralized Debt Obligations, N.Y. TIMES: TIMES TOPICS (Oct. 19, 2011),
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/collateralized-debtobligations/index.html.
22 P.M. Vasudev, Default Swaps and Director Oversight: Lessons from AIG, 35 J. CORP.
L. 757, 760 (2010).
23 John D. Finnerty & Kishlaya Pathak, A Review of Recent Derivatives Litigation, 16
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 73, 88 (2011). The event triggering the payment from the third
party to the individual does not necessarily have to be default. Jeremy C. Kress, Credit Default
Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Systemic Risk: Why Centralized Counterparties Must Have Access
to Central Bank Liquidity, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 49, 52 (2011) (Credit Default Swaps “may
also protect against debt restructuring or credit rating downgrade”.).
24 William T. Coleman, Jr., A Brief History of Banking and Investment Regulation in the
US and a Challenge to Remain the Greatest Nation in the World, 99 KY. L.J. 1, 4 (2010).
25 For a variation of this simple example, see Kress supra note 23 at 52; see also Alex
Blumberg, Unregulated Credit Default Swaps Led to Weakness, NPR (Oct. 31, 2008),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=96395271&ft=1&f=94427042
(explaining the basic principles of a default credit swap).
26 Finnerty & Pathak, supra, note 23 at 88.
27 See Coleman, Jr., supra note 24, at 4 (claiming that “[e]ssentially, a credit default swap
is a life insurance policy on a security”).
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credit default swap also owns the investment on which the instrument
is based, the swap operates as insurance.
Not all credit default swaps, however, serve the traditional
insurance function.28 Instead, investors who do not own a debt
instrument29—e.g., bonds, or notes—but believe that the institution
issuing the debt will face some type of crisis in the future buy credit
default swaps from third parties for “protection” against that crisis.30
Imagine Tim taking out “insurance” on Ben’s car—without having
any ownership stake in the vehicle—because he believes someone
will soon steal it.31 Effectively, investors pay third parties monthly
premiums or up-front payments with the hope that a credit event
befalls the debt instrument, leaving the investor with a large payout
from his credit default swap. When investors use swaps in this
manner, it is easy to view them as speculators32 or gamblers.33
B. The Benefits of Credit Default Swaps
From a macroeconomic viewpoint, the credit-default-swap market
provides two main benefits to the broader economy. First, credit
28 See Michael Lewis & David Einhorn, How to Repair a Broken Financial World, N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
3,
2009,
at
WK9,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/opinion/04lewiseinhornb.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all
(explaining that we can “[c]all [credit default swaps] insurance if you like, but it’s not the
insurance most people know”).
29 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648, 679
(2010) (“There is no requirement that one actually own the underlying credit instrument in order
to purchase a credit default swap.”).
30 See Kress, supra note 23, at 53 (“[T]he majority of the [credit-default-swap] market is
now comprised of so-called ‘naked’ [credit default swaps] that enable protection buyers to bet
against the credit quality of assets they do not own.”).
31 For a similar explanations, see Blumberg, supra note 25 (“Let’s say there’s a guy
named Frank and he has a life insurance policy. When he dies, the beneficiary gets a million
dollars. Now imagine a whole bunch of other people saying, ‘I want a million dollars if he dies,
too.’ And so they take out life insurance policies on Frank.”); Lewis & Einhorn, supra note 28
(“It’s more like buying fire insurance on your neighbor’s house.”).
32 Vasudev, supra note 22, at 764 (“Thus, multiple swaps for CDOs complete the
transition of default swaps from their conception as hedges against risk into instruments of pure
financial speculation.”); Nathaniel G. Dutt, Current United States Credit Default Swap
Regulatory Initiatives: A New World Standard or Just a Ploy?, 16 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L.
169, 209–210 (2009) (discussing the speculative nature of the credit-default-swap market);
Kress, supra note 23, at 52 (“Market participants use [credit default swaps] in a variety of ways,
including hedging and speculation.”).
Although an investor may still be hedging against other bets he has in the market, his use
of the credit default swap without any equity in the underlying asset is, effectively, “the
buying . . . of something with the expectation of profiting from price fluctuations,” in this case
the value of the asset decreasing to a level that causes the credit default swap to trigger.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1435 (8th ed. 2004).
33 Andrew M. Kulpa, Minimal Deterrence: The Market Impact, Legal Fallout, and
Impending Regulation of Credit Default Swaps, 5 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 293, 298 (2009)
(“[Credit-default-swap] agreements also resemble gambling or gaming contracts. However,
gaming contracts, much like insurance contracts, face strict governmental oversight.”).

2012]

EMPTY CREDITOR SYNDROME AND VIVISEPULTURE

1291

default swaps allow investors and creditors to hedge against risk by
permitting them to “offset[ ] their exposure to the risk of loss that is
inherent in lending arrangements such as credit facilities or the
acquisition of debt securities.”34 More specifically:
Credit default swaps separate the risk of loss that a creditor
faces upon entering into a debt investment and redistributes
the risk among the creditor and its credit default swap
counterparties. As a result of the redistribution, risk is not
concentrated in the same manner that risk is concentrated
between a single borrower and a single lender engaged in a
traditional credit arrangement.35
In addition to benefiting investors and creditors, this risk-shifting
helps the broader financial market because, “[i]f derivative contracts
allow an agent such as a producer to hedge the risk of cash market
price fluctuations[,] this may reduce the risk premium that the
produce[r] will apply in making investment decisions.”36 Such a
reduction decreases producers’ cost of production and, therefore, may
lead to lower prices for consumers.37
Second, the credit-default-swap market assists the broader
economy by acting as a pricing mechanism “by giving an incentive to
agents to become better forecasters of market conditions in the
future.”38 The market helps “allocat[e] resources to the most valuable
uses”39 because, “if in the future there will be an increase in demand
that will lead to a price increase, then [market participants] who buy
derivatives contracts . . . will bid up their prices in anticipation of that
demand increase.”40 Thus, producers of financial instruments are
better able to understand what to produce, for whom, and at what
price.41

34 Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap Commons,
82 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 199 (2011).
35 Id. at 200 (citation omitted).
36 Ronald W. Anderson, Credit Default Swaps: What Are the Social Benefits and Costs?,
BANQUE DE FRANCE FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW, No. 14, July 2010 at 1, 2, available at
http://www.banquefrance.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/banque_de_france/publications/Revue_de_la_stabilite_financier
e/etude01_rsf_1007.pdf.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.; cf. Floyd Norris, The Naked Truth on Credit-Default Swaps, N.Y. TIMES, May 21,
2010, at B1 (“To most on Wall Street, the answer is obvious: let markets function. My buying
that insurance will probably drive up the price, and serve as a market indication that people are
worried about the credit, which is good because it gives a warning to others.”).
41 See Anderson, supra note 36, at 2.
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C. The Role of Credit Default Swaps in the Great Recession
Although credit default swaps may appear to be a rather harmless
way for investors to make money, one of the United States’ most
famous investors, Warren Buffet, once described them as “financial
weapons of mass destruction.”42 At the heart of this ominous
description is Buffet’s understanding that credit default swaps
produce systemic risk.43 That systemic risk becomes apparent when
one understands that numerous investors can purchase credit default
swaps on the same type of investment or even the same investment
itself.44 For instance, consider the following hypothetical.
First, imagine that Investor L, who owns Company X’s bonds,
purchases a credit default swap from Insurance Firm Z to hedge
against the risk that X will fail to make payment on those bonds.
Under this deal, Z agrees to pay L $1,000,000 if X fails to meet its
obligations so long as L makes monthly payments to Z of $1,000.
Second, Insurance Firm Z, confident that X will not fail to make
payments, strikes the same deal with Investors M and N. Third,
Investor L, noticing that other investors believe that X may go
bankrupt, originates her own credit default swap with a $1,000,000
payout if X fails and sells it to Mutual Fund A. In return, A promises
to pay L $2,000 per month. Not to be outsmarted, Investors M and N
also originate and sell credit default swaps to Mutual Funds B and C,
respectively, for $2,000 per month.45
At this point, Mutual Funds A, B, and C hold credit default swaps
protecting against X’s bankruptcy that they purchased from Investors
L, M, and N. L, M, and N also hold credit default swaps protecting
against X’s bankruptcy that they purchased from Insurance Firm Z. L,
M, and N think that they have made out well: (1) they each are
making $2,000 per month from Mutual Fund A, B, or C, while only
paying $1,000 per month to Insurance Firm Z; and (2), even if
Company X files for bankruptcy, they can each pay $1,000,000 to
42 James B. Kelleher, Buffet’s “Time Bomb” Goes off on Wall Street, REUTERS (Sep. 18,
2008,
1:42
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/09/18/us-derivatives-creditidUSN1837154020080918.
43 Id. (“When historians write about the current crisis, much of the blame will go to the
slump in the housing and mortgage markets, which triggered the losses, layoffs[,] and
liquidations sweeping the financial industry. But credit default swaps—complex derivatives
originally designed to protect banks from deadbeat borrowers—are adding to the turmoil.”).
44 Johnson, supra note 34, at 212 (“During the recent financial crisis, investigations
revealed that a concentration of significant financial institutions participated in the credit default
swap market. This concentration of significant financial market participants contributed to
systemic risk and moral hazard concerns.”).
45 This explanation stems from an example of a credit-default-swap market in Blumberg,
supra note 25.

2012]

EMPTY CREDITOR SYNDROME AND VIVISEPULTURE

1293

their respective Mutual-Fund counterparties with the $1,000,000 that
Z has agreed to pay them upon the occurrence of the same event.
Now, assume X files for bankruptcy. Theoretically, Z would pay
$1,000,000 to each of the Investors and those Investors in turn would
pay $1,000,000 to each of the Mutual Funds. But what if Z cannot
afford to pay $1,000,000 to the three Investors? The result is systemic
destabilization, as investors across markets are injured—either the
Investors or the Mutual Funds take the significant loss of
$1,000,000.46
Sadly, this is not markedly different from what actually occurred
when the housing market crashed in 2008.47 Indeed, in 2007, the
credit-default-swap market reached an “estimated . . . $62.2
trillion,”48 with many of the credit-default-swap contracts tied to
financial instruments linked to home mortgages.49 And, importantly,
“investigations [have] revealed that a concentration of significant
financial institutions participated in the credit default swap market.”50
For instance, American International Group, Inc. (“AIG”), faced
daunting financial obligations due to credit default swaps when
property values rapidly declined:
The government rescued AIG . . . to prevent it from going
bankrupt because it had promised a lot of money, which it
didn’t have, to people holding credit default swap agreements
46 See id. (“Satyajit Das, a risk consultant with nearly 20 years of experience working with
credit default swaps, says that netting works fine as long as everyone stays in business. ‘If the
chain breaks down anywhere where one party does not actually honor their contracts, then the
losses multiply rapidly,’ he says. ‘It links everybody together in this unholy chain and so what
happens is if one party has a problem, then everybody else has a problem.’”).
47 Vasudev, supra note 22, at 763–64 (citing Michael S. Gibson, Credit Derivatives and
Risk Management, 92 FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REV., no. 4, 2007 at 25, 39)
(“[The amount of credit default swaps in the market], which is truly staggering, was most likely
in excess of the underlying debt, which suggests the possibility of multiple swaps for the
portfolios. In other words, a number of default swaps were issued for a single debt obligation.
Michael Gibson has pointed out, ‘[a]s the credit derivative market has grown, it has become
common for the notional amount of CDS outstanding referencing a particular issuer to be larger
than the face value of the issuer's bonds outstanding.’ This fact clearly points towards multiple
swaps for debt securities.”).
48 Vasudev, supra note 22, at 763; see also Clearing the Fog: Credit Derivatives Continue
to Boom, But the Old Order Is Under Threat, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 17, 2008),
http://www.economist.com/node/11060804?story_id=11060804 (“The overall market for overthe-counter derivatives shot up to $455 trillion at the end of 2007. Some $62 trillion of that were
credit-default swaps (CDSs), whose supercharged growth continues in spite of the crunch.”).
49 Andrea S. Kramer, Alton B. Harris, & Robert A. Ansehl, The New York State Insurance
Department and Credit Default Swaps: Good Intentions, Bad Idea, 22 J. OF TAX’N & REG. OF
FIN. INST., no. 3, at 22, 22 n.1 (Jan./Feb. 2009); see also Janet Morrissey, Credit Default Swaps:
The
Next
Crisis?,
TIME
(Mar.
17,
2008),
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1723152,00.html (“[Credit default swaps]
typically apply to municipal bonds, corporate debt and mortgage securities . . . .”).
50 Johnson, supra note 34, at 212.
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with the company. ‘From recollection, I don’t believe the
number got to $500 billion, but it was certainly in totality
around $400 billion,’ sa[id] former CEO Martin Sullivan.51
Wells Fargo, through its purchase of Wachovia,52 also faced
considerable credit-default-swap liability,53 and “Bear Stearns, a topten actor in [credit default swaps], [was] rescued partly because of the
fear of chaos if such a large counterparty [in the credit-default-swap
market] were to fold.”54 Likewise, Lehman Brothers’ former Chief
Executive Officer, Richard Fuld, “blamed his firm’s collapse partly
on ‘destabilizing’ forces including the escalating cost of swaps on the
investment bank’s debt.”55
In total, estimates suggest that credit default swap “strategies . . .
contributed to $1.82 trillion in write-downs and losses amid the worst
financial crisis since the Great Depression.”56 Given the sheer volume
of the credit-default-swap market57 and the dangers that exposure to it
caused major financial institutions and our economy as a whole, an
obvious question arises: Where were the regulations and regulators
that “protect investors, maintain orderly markets and promote
financial stability”?58

51 Blumberg, supra note 25; see also Vasudev, supra note 22, at 775 (“AIG . . . estimated
the subprime component in its default swap basket at $61.4 billion. But the assistance provided
by the federal government since September 2008 is reported to be over $170 billion. This
indicates that the loss in default swaps business went beyond the subprime exposure estimated
by AIG.”) (citation omitted); George Soros, One Way to Stop Bear Raids: Credit Default Swaps
Need Much Stricter Regulation, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2009, at A17 (“AIG failed because it sold
large amounts of credit default swaps (CDS) without properly offsetting or covering their
positions.”).
52 Sara Lepro, Wells Fargo Buys Wachovia for $15.1 Billion, ABC NEWS (Oct. 3, 2008),
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/SmartHome/story?id=5946486&page=1.
53 John Carney, Wells Fargo’s Ticking Time Bomb: Credit Default Swaps On Commercial
Mortgages, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sep. 17, 2009, 1:41 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/johncarney-wells-fargos-ticking-time-bomb-credit-default-swaps-on-commercial-mortgages-2009-9.
54 THE ECONOMIST, supra note 48.
55 Shannon D. Harrington & Christine Harper, Wall Street Shrinks from Credit Default
Swaps
Before
Rules
Hit,
BLOOMBERG
(Nov.
29,
2010,
12:00
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-29/wall-street-shrinks-from-default-swaps-as-doddfrank-rules-hit-speculators.html.
56 Id.; see also Morrissey, supra note 49 (“[T]he top 25 banks [held] more than $13
trillion in credit default swaps . . . at the end of the third quarter of 2007 . . . . JP Morgan Chase,
Citibank, Bank of America and Wachovia were ranked among the top four most active . . . .”).
57 $62.2 trillion is more than four times the annual gross domestic product of the United
States. World Factbook: United States, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/us.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2012) (click on “Economy :: UNITED STATES”)
(estimating that the United States’ gross domestic product for 2010 would be $14.82 trillion).
58 Financial Regulation, FINANCIAL TIMES LEXICON (last visited Mar.. 30, 2012),
http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=financial-regulation.
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D. Dodd-Frank’s Regulation of Credit Default Swap
Despite their similarity to insurance, the law did not regulate credit
default swaps prior to Dodd-Frank to the same extent that it regulates
the traditional insurance industry.59 For instance, state law often
mandates that insurance providers disclose financial information,60
allow regulators and shareholders to inspect their “books and
records,”61 and “require an insurer to maintain a specified amount of
capital or surplus or reserves to meet liabilities.”62 In contrast, prior to
Dodd-Frank, credit default swaps and the credit-default-swap market
were generally unregulated.63 Indeed, the federal rules governing
credit default swaps were “the anti-fraud and anti-manipulation
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.”64 The lack of regulation meant that participants in the
credit-default-swap market traded the instrument in an “over-the-

59 See State of New York Insurance Department, Office of General Counsel, Funding
Agreement
Securitizations
(Apr.
18,
2000)
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/ogco2000/rg004181.htm (the State of New York deciding not
to consider credit default swaps as insurance contracts). But see State of New York Insurance
Department, “Best practices” for Financial Guaranty Insurers, Circular Letter No. 19 (Sept. 22,
2008), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/circltr/2008/cl08_19.htm (reversing this policy).
For an explanation of why credit default swaps are not treated like insurance, see Credit
Default
Swap
Regulation
Overview,
KRAMER
LEVIN
(Nov.
2008),
http://www.kramerlevin.com/files/Publication/8c676a8c-c444-4091-827b008b78feaa15/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/f31d02c5-7ce3-4ea6-9fa702b2ac07d509/5361_Alert_CDSwaps_v7.pdf (“The conclusion that [credit default swaps] are
not insurance contracts is based upon the fact that the buyer of credit protection under a [credit
default swap] need not suffer any loss nor provide any evidence of any loss with respect to the
relevant reference entity or obligation to receive payment from seller.”).
60 1 COUCH ON INS. § 2:24 (3d ed. 2009) (“In order to facilitate governmental control of
insurers, and in some instances to make information available to the stockholders, members, or
policyholders of insurers, or to the public at large, statutes provide for the filing of specified
information with a government officer or commission. Such information may consist of a
classification of risks and premium rates, policy forms, annual business transaction reports, or
current financial condition. Statutes may require the publication of annual statements in daily
papers designated by the insurance commissioners, making reports to the comptroller, or for
returns to the insurance commissioner.”) (citations omitted).
61 Id. § 2:25.
62 Id. § 2:27.
63 Letter from Timothy F. Geithner, United States Secretary of the Treasury, to Harry
Reid,
United
States
Senator
(May
13,
2009),
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/OTCletter20090513.pdf (writing that the
credit-default-swap market, among others, before Dodd Frank “[were] largely excluded or
exempted from regulation”); see also Dutt, supra note 32, at 186 (“The current state of CDS
market regulation in the United States is quite limited.”).
64 KRAMER LEVIN, supra note 59, at 1; see also Kramer, Harris, & Ansehl, supra note 49
at 26 (“As a result of the [Commodity Futures Modernization Act in 2000], [credit default
swaps] and other [over-the-counter] derivative contracts [were] not subject to any federal
regulation.”).
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counter”65 fashion, where “participants . . . transacted . . . bilaterally
without the facilitation of an exchange.”66
The use of an over-the-counter market and the non-regulation of
credit default swaps in general created economic problems. First, the
presence of an exchange forces “buyers and sellers [to] choose from
standardized listed products, and [ensures that] counterparties rarely
interact directly, relying instead on the exchange to facilitate contract
settlement.”67 Without the stabilizing force an exchange provides,
traders in the credit-default-swap market “independently negotiate[d]
terms and settle[d] contracts,”68 which exposed those parties to the
risk of “less transparency than [they would otherwise have in]
exchange-based markets.”69 As a result, there were “complicat[ions]
in risk management and regulation of [over-the-counter] products.” 70
A lack of transparency caused uncertainty within the market
because participants were unaware of the maneuvers, positions, or
relative stability of their counterparts,71 which led to a second
problem: the fact that market participants were counterparties to each
other “creat[ed] a daisy chain of systemic risk throughout the
financial system.”72 This was troublesome because “market
participants [were] unable to discern how much contingent exposure
their counterparties ha[d] to other market participants.”73 Because the
counterparties in the pre-2008 over-the-counter market were
predominately major institutions—e.g., AIG, Wachovia, Wells Fargo,
Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns—systemic risk was high.74
65 Kress, supra note 23, at 54; see also Johnson, supra note 34, at 195 (“In the years
leading to the financial crisis, credit default swap agreements traded in the OTC market . . . .”).
66 Kress, supra note 23, at 54; see also Johnson, supra note 34, at 195 (writing that, in the
over-the-counter market, “counterparties engage[] directly, transacting with one another without
the services or public disclosures involved in trading securities on an exchange or other formal
trading platform”).
67 Kress, supra note 23, at 54; see also Johnson, supra note 34, at 196 (“[Over-thecounter] markets historically lacked . . . regulatory oversight.”).
68 Kress, supra note 23, at 54.
69 Id. at 54–55.
70 Id. at 55.
71 Johnson, supra note 34, at 196 (quoting Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n: The Role of
Derivatives in the Financial Crisis 3 (July 1, 2010) (statement of Gary Gensler, Chairman,
Commodity
Futures
Trading
Comm’n),
available
at
http://fcicstatic.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0701-Gensler.pdf) (“[T]he lack of
transparency in the OTC market resulted in market participants being ‘unable to adequately
judge the risks they were assuming.’”).
72 William Spencer Topham, Re-Regulating “Financial Weapons of Mass Destruction,”
Observations on Repealing the Commodity Futures Modernization Act and Future Derivative
Regulation, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 133, 137 (2010).
73 Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L.
REV. 211, 243 (2009) (citations omitted).
74 Even after the brunt of the financial crisis passed, a small number of firms continue to
dominate the credit-default-swap market. David M. Katz, Five Firms Hold 80% of Derivatives
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As such, some commentators called for Congress to completely
ban market participants’ ability to purchase credit default swaps
without having an interest in the debt instrument underlying the
swap.75 While Congress chose not to transform the market in such a
stark way,76 “[Dodd-Frank] will drastically change the regulation of
trading of derivatives instruments in the United States”77 because it
made substantial modifications to the regulatory treatment of the
credit-default-swap market.78
Dodd-Frank’s specific section dealing with credit default swaps
and other derivatives, is entitled “Prohibition against Federal
Government bailouts of swaps entities,”79 which suggests that
Congress recognized derivatives’ injurious effects over the past few
years. Dodd-Frank takes the previously unregulated market for credit
default swaps and grants two bodies—the Securities and Exchange
Commission and Commodity Futures Trading Commission—
regulatory powers over the instrument.80 And “[p]robably the most
significant change made by [Dodd-Frank]” is the requirement that
credit-default-swap contracts be “traded on an exchange (or swapexecution facility) and cleared by a clearing organization.”81 Further,

Risk,
Fitch
Report
Finds,
CFO.COM
(July
24,
2009),
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/14113089/?f=rsspage (“About 80% of the derivative assets and
liabilities carried on the balance sheets of 100 companies reviewed by Fitch were held by five
banks: JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, and Morgan Stanley.
Those five banks also account for more than 96% of the companies' exposure to credit
derivatives.”).
75 See, e.g., Soros, supra note 51 (“Only those who own the underlying bonds ought to be
allowed to buy them.”); Rolfe Winkler, Credit Default Swaps Should Be Regulated As
Insurance,
MYNEWMARKETS.COM
(Aug.
3,
2009),
http://www.mynewmarkets.com/articles/102605/credit-default-swaps-should-be-regulated-asinsurance (suggesting the government “[r]egulate [credit default swaps] as insurance”); Smith,
supra note 18 (“[C]entral clearing and/or putting [credit default swaps] on exchanges are
inadequate remedies.”).
76 See Lawrence D. Hui & Mary Kuan, Legal Update: Impact of Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act on Derivatives Trading, KLEINBERG, KAPLAN, WOLFF &
COHEN,
6
(Aug.
2010),
http://www.kkwc.com/library_cat/uf_Impact_of_DoddFrank_Wall_St__Reform.pdf (“The Dodd-Frank Act . . . provid[es] that states may not regulate
swaps as insurance.”).
77 Id. at 1; see also Eileen Bannon & Yoo-Keyong Kwon, Derivatives Regulation Under
Dodd-Frank: Potential Implications for Insurance Products and Companies, DEWEY &
LEBOEUF,
1
(Mar.
17,
2011),
http://www.deweyleboeuf.com/~/media/Files/attorneyarticles/2011/20110317_DerivativesRegul
ation.ashx (“Title VII of [Dodd-Frank] accomplishes a sweeping reform of the previously
largely unregulated derivatives market.”).
78 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203,
§§ 721–54, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641–1754 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7 & 15 U.S.C.).
79 § 716, 124 Stat. at 1648.
80 Hui & Kuan, supra note 76, at 2.
81 Id. at 3; see also Kress, supra note 23, at 61 (“[Dodd Frank] calls for [credit default
swaps] to be traded through centralized counterparties, or clearinghouses.”); Daniel Waldman &
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“dealers” of credit default swaps will now be subject to
“comprehensive registration requirements, as well as capital and
margin requirements, and rules governing business conduct and
record keeping.”82 Finally, “[d]ealers that are banks will be subject to
capital and margin requirements set by their banking regulators.”83
These rules addressed numerous areas of concern regarding the
credit-default-swap market. First, by placing credit default swaps into
exchanges, “[c]ounterparty risk is [now] diffused through [the] central
clearinghouse.”84 Essentially, the “[central clearinghouse] acts as a
middleman: the original, bilateral contract is replaced by two separate
contracts, one each between the original parties and the
[clearinghouse].”85 This brings forth “[t]he potential benefit[] . . . [of]
transparency and much lower transaction costs,”86 because
participants on both sides of trades will have a better understanding of
the prices of similar contracts and the types of different contracts
made by other market participants.87
Second, “the clearing corporation essentially guarantees the
derivatives contracts for each side of the trade and requires all of its
members to post sufficient margin so as to safeguard the clearing of
the trades,”88 which is vital because, as some commentators contend,
“[t]he most critical role for regulation is to make sure that the sellers
of risk have the capital to support their bets.”89 Ultimately,
clearinghouses “reduce systemic risk by netting offsetting exposures
and mutualizing counterparty risk among all of their members.”90

Ahmad Hajj, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to Significantly
Impact Derivatives Trading of Banks, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, 1 (July 2010),
http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/Advisory--DoddFrank%20Wall%20Street%20Reform%20and%20Consumer%20Protection%20Act_071410.pdf
(“Participants in derivatives trades could also be required to clear many or all of their swaps
through a central clearing house.”).
82 Hui & Kuan, supra note 76, at 4–5; see also Waldman & Hajj, supra note 81, at 1
(“Banks that fit within the Act’s definition of ‘swap dealer’ or ‘major swap participant’ (MSP)
would be subject to new requirements that could include: registration, capital and margin,
reporting and record-keeping, as well as new business conduct standards.”).
83 Hui & Kuan, supra note 76, at 5.
84 Id. at 3.
85 Kress, supra note 23, at 61.
86 THE ECONOMIST, supra note 48.
87 See Dutt, supra note 32, at 195 (“A centralized clearinghouse for [credit default swaps]
transactions would reduce counterparty and systemic risks and increase market transparency and
liquidity.”).
88 See Hui & Kuan, supra note 76, at 3.
89 Lewis & Einhorn, supra note 28, at WK10.
90 Kress, supra note 23, at 61; see also Dutt, supra note 32, at 195 (“The clearinghouse
will reduce counterparty risk by becoming the counterparty to every [credit-default-swap]
transaction.”).
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These regulations, however, do not address all of the problems
credit default swaps create. Namely, these regulations fail to prevent
unnecessary bankruptcies brought on by credit default swaps, which
is the focus of this Comment.
II. EMPTY CREDITOR SYNDROME: HOW AND WHY CREDIT-DEFAULTSWAP HOLDERS CAUSE UNNECESSARY BANKRUPTCIES
Despite taking important steps to reduce the systemic risk that
credit default swaps cause, Dodd-Frank did not address an important
risk that credit default swaps create: the potential that swap holders
“may prefer to force [a] company into bankruptcy, rather than agree
to a restructuring, because the bankruptcy filing will trigger a
contractual payoff.”91 Although this may seem counterintuitive, a
simple illustration shows how this works in theory.
Remember that Investor L owns Company X’s bonds and that she
also purchased a credit default swap to hedge against the possibility
that X would be unable to fulfill its obligations on those bonds. Next,
assume that X is teetering on the edge of bankruptcy and hopes to
restructure its debt to ensure that it can continue to operate. This
restructuring, however, would require L to accept less than the full
amount that X owes her from the bonds. In this scenario, L may
prefer to receive the payout from her credit default swap rather than
agree to the restructuring, a preference that could force X into
bankruptcy.92 Indeed, if L is a rational actor, she will prefer X to fail.
Moreover, if L is acting on behalf of other investors—if she manages
a hedge fund, for instance—she may have a fiduciary obligation to
91 Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II:
Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 732 (2008) [hereinafter Hu & Black,
Empty Voting II]; see also Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Future of Chapter 11,
81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 405, 427 (2007) (“[C]redit derivatives may ultimately discourage out-ofcourt restructurings . . . .”); cf. Johnson, supra note 34, at 209 (citation omitted) (“Credit default
swaps allow market participants to share the risk of a borrower's default. Therefore, when a
lender purchases a credit default swap to offset its exposure if the reference entity defaults, the
lender may have diminished incentives to assist the issuer of the debt that is the underlying asset
in the credit default swap agreement.”).
92 Professors Hu and Black use the following example: “Suppose, for example, that a
hedge fund, bank, or other investor holds $200 million of a company’s bonds, but is also long a
$500 million notional amount in credit default swaps on this debt.” Hu & Black, Empty Voting
II, supra note 91, at 731–32. It is also important to note that, even if Investor L had purchased
the same amount of protection against default that he was owed under the bond payment, or
even somewhat less, L might still prefer bankruptcy because of the inherent costs involved in
bankruptcy proceedings. Cf. Caroline Salas & Shannon D. Harrington, Darth Wall Street
Thwarting Debtors with Credit Default Swaps, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 5, 2009, 1:03 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aZjMcuIoat7U&refer=home
(“‘Say you’ve lent $100 million to a company and you had bought $100 million in credit-default
swaps,’ said Henry Hu, a law professor at the University of Texas in Austin. ‘In that
circumstance, the creditor really doesn’t care whether or not the company goes under.’”).
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prefer X’s bankruptcy.93 This phenomenon—“where a lender who has
bought protection on an underlying loan, bond or credit exposure may
have an incentive to put the reference entity into bankruptcy or
Chapter 11”94—is called “empty creditor syndrome.”95
Empty creditor syndrome begins with the understanding that “a
traditional conception of debt ownership includes a standard package
of economic rights (principally principal and interest payments),
control rights, default rights, and other rights and obligations under
contractual covenants, federal bankruptcy law, and, to a limited
extent, state corporate law.”96 When a creditor purchases a credit
default swap providing a payout if the company he invests in defaults
on its obligation, the creditor hedges its risk in the original debt
transaction.97 Despite this hedge, the creditor retains full voting rights
in bankruptcy. As one commentator notes:
A creditor who has partly or fully hedged through a credit
default swap nevertheless retains full contractual rights under
the loan agreement or bond indenture, and full voting rights
in bankruptcy. In contrast, the holder of the long side of the
credit default swap bears default risk, but has no control
rights.98
Because creditors who hold credit default swaps on the debt they
have provided are not saddled with the same economic concerns as
other individuals or entities who share that control, they may have
“incentives to vote against the interests of other shareholders.”99

This assumes the companies only duty is to maximize return to its investors.
Satyajit Das, Credit Default Swaps—Financial Innovation or Financial Dysfunction?,
BANQUE DE FRANCE FIN. STABILITY REV., July 2010, at 45, 50, available at
http://www.banquefrance.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/banque_de_france/publications/Revue_de_la_stabilite_financier
e/etude06_rsf_1007.pdf.
95 Id.; see also Henry T.C. Hu, Op-Ed., ‘Empty Creditors’ and the Crisis, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 10, 2009, at A13 (“Thus the ‘empty creditor’: someone (or institution) who may have the
contractual control but, by simultaneously holding credit default swaps, little or no economic
exposure if the debt goes bad. Indeed, if a creditor holds enough credit default swaps, he may
simultaneously have control rights and incentives to cause the debtor firm’s value to fall. And if
bankruptcy occurs, the empty creditor may undermine proper reorganization, especially if his
interests (or non-interests) are not fully disclosed to the bankruptcy court.”).
96 Hu & Black, Empty Voting II, supra note 91, at 728.
97 See id. (“One simple way for a creditor to hedge involves a credit default swap.”).
98 Id. at 730–31; see also Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Debt and Hybrid Decoupling:
An Overview, M & A LAWYER, Aug. 2008 at 1 (confirming the decoupling of rights of the
creditors debtors in relationship to credit default swaps) [hereinafter Hu & Black, Debt and
Hybrid Decoupling: An Overview].
99 Hu & Black, Empty Voting II ,supra note 91, at 731.
93

94
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Importantly, these “creditor[s] might prefer that the company fail, and
hence oppose an out-of-court restructuring.”100
Unfortunately, empty creditor syndrome is not simply a theoretical
problem.101 Take, for example, Six Flags’ bankruptcy in 2009.102
Roughly, one month prior to filing, Six Flags attempted to stave off
financial ruin with a “debt-for-equity exchange” offer that would have
allowed bondholders to exchange their debt for an equity position in
the company.103 To complete the deal, Six Flags required that “95%
of its outstanding [debt holders] participate[]” in the exchange.104 For
the majority of Six Flags’ bondholders, this deal made sense, as their
investments would lose considerable value if the company filed for
bankruptcy.105 Indeed, “most bondholders favored” Six Flags’
offer.106
The same may not have been true, however, for one of the
company’s major bondholders: Fidelity Investments. Fidelity “had
bought credit default swaps to insure itself against the possibility that
[Six Flags] would file for bankruptcy.”107 Additionally, Fidelity’s
debt holdings constituted a “blocking stake,” meaning that, if “[it]
refused to participate in the exchange, Six Flags had no legal remedy
except to reduce the participation threshold or to file for
bankruptcy.”108 Within one month of its debt-for-equity offer, Six
Flags failed to garner enough bondholder support for the
restructuring, and the company filed for Chapter 11 protection.109
100 Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Debt, Equity and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance
and Systemic Risk Implications, 14 EURO. FIN. MAN. 663, 682 (2008) [hereinafter Hu & Black,
Governance and Systemic Risk].
101 George Washington, Guest Post: Credit Default Swaps—Love ‘Em, Ban ‘Em, or Tax
‘Em?, NAKED CAPITALISM (Sept. 30, 2009, 1:06 AM), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2009/
09/guest-post-credit-default-swaps-love-em-ban-em-or-tax-em.html (“And don’t forget that
credit default swap counterparties drive company after company into bankruptcy, and that—
once a company the counterparties aare [sic] betting against goes bankrupt—the counterparties
cut in line in front of all of the bankruptcy creditors to get paid.”).
102 Michael J. De La Merced, Six Flags Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y TIMES (June 13, 2009,
11:26 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/06/13/six-flags-files-for-bankruptcy/.
103 Daniel Hemel, Comment, Empty Creditors and Debt Exchanges, 27 YALE J. ON REG.
159, 159 (2010).
104 Id.
105 Id. at 159–160.
106 Id. at 160.
107 Id. (citing Michael S. Rosenwald, Plagued by Debt, Six Flags Faces Its Own Wild Ride,
WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2009, at A10).
108 Id. at 163 (citation omitted).
109 See Johnson, supra note 34, at 209 (“[S]ome posit that the recent bankruptcies at
automakers General Motors Company and Chrysler LLC demonstrate the need to evaluate
carefully traditional assumptions about creditors’ intentions and presumed responses to a
distressed debtor.”); Hemel, supra note 103, at 161 (citing Tom Krisher, Chrysler Debtholder
Talks
Pick
Up
Pace;
GM
Stalled,
ABC
NEWS
(Apr.
15,
2009),
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=7332901 and Loren Steffy, Credit-Default
Swaps: Banking on Bankruptcy, HOUSTON CHRON., July 22, 2009, at 1).
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Importantly, Six Flags’ bankruptcy is not an isolated incident.
Indeed, a number of bankruptcies during the past few years have
involved empty creditors.110 For instance, commentators have pointed
to the “corporate bankruptcies of Canadian newsprint producer
AbitibiBowater Inc. and U.S. shopping center developer General
Growth Properties Inc.” as instances where “credit default swaps
became an actual bankruptcy catalyst.”111 Others believe that creditdefault-swap holders drove General Motors Co.’s and Chrysler LLC’s
bankruptcies.112 Likewise, creditors may have pushed LyondellBasell
Industries, a chemical company traded on the New York Stock
Exchange that filed for bankruptcy in 2009,113 toward failure.114 And,
although neither situation ended in bankruptcy, some contend that
“Ford Motor Co. [was being] pushed toward bankruptcy by
bondholders trying to profit from credit default swaps that protect
against losses on their high-yield debt,”115 while others believe that
“YRC Worldwide . . . , one of the largest trucking companies in the
United States,” faced the same pressure.116 Likewise, some argue that,
in the time leading up to the federal bailout, “Goldman Sachs was . . .
an empty creditor of AIG.”117
As both theory and practice show, parties in the credit-defaultswap market may have incentives that run counter to those of other
creditors118 and, more importantly, to those of the broader

110 Samuel M. Kidder, Comment, What’s Your Position? Amending the Bankruptcy
Disclosure Rules to Keep Pace with Financial Innovation, 58 UCLA L. REV. 803, 807 (2011)
(“There is anecdotal evidence of net short [sic] creditors refusing to participate in out-of-court
workout agreements . . .”).
111 Martin Hutchinson, Ban Credit Default Swaps? These Corporate Bankruptcies Show
We
Should,
CONTRARIAN
PROFITS
(Apr.
23,
2009),
http://www.contrarianprofits.com/articles/ban-credit-default-swaps-these-corporatebankruptcies-show-we-should/15849.
112 See Hemel, supra note 103, at 159–161. With respect to General Motors in particular,
see Daniel Gross, Why GM Might Go Bankrupt, SLATE (May 12, 2009, 3:46 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2009/05/why_gm_may_go_bankrupt.html.
113 Ana Campoy & Marie Beaudette, Lyondell’s U.S. Arm in Chapter 11: Dutch Chemical
Maker Struggled With Heavy Debt from 2007 Acquisition, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 6, 2009, 7:45 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123127968554958711.html.
114 See Hemel, supra note 103, at 160–161.
115 Salas & Harrington, supra note 92.
116 See Kidder, supra note 110, at 808–809.
117 Hu, ‘Empty Creditors’ and the Crisis, supra note 95.
118 Norris, supra note 40 (“There is another, little noticed, possible impact of credit-default
swaps. They can undermine bankruptcy laws. Normally, a creditor wants to keep a company out
of bankruptcy if there is a decent chance it can survive. If it does go broke, the creditor wants to
maximize the value of the company anyway, so that more will be available to pay creditors. But
what happens if a major creditor, who might even control one class of bonds, has a much larger
position in credit-default swaps? Will he not have interests directly at odds with those of other
creditors, since he will do better if the company ends up with less to pay its creditors? Might
that creditor seek to, and perhaps be able to, sabotage the company’s best hopes for revival?”).
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economy.119 “The toll that business failure exacts on dependent
constituencies goes beyond job loss and creditor recovery statistics.
The closing of a failed business may produce shock waves that
reverberate throughout the local, regional or national economy.”120
Given the United States’ recent emergence from a long-lasting
recession, the negative effects of bankruptcies on the economy at
large,121 and the trillions of dollars of credit default swaps currently in
circulation,122 Congress should address empty creditor syndrome as it
relates to failed restructurings and premature bankruptcies.123
III. COMBATTING EMPTY CREDITOR SYNDROME
Ultimately, “the lifeblood of corporate reorganizations is and
always has been negotiation. Creating the optimal environment for
facilitating such negotiation is the principal business of those who
shape the law.”124 Perhaps in recognition of this general principle,
typical “financial covenants, especially in bank loan agreements, are
often written fairly strictly, to provide an early warning of financial
trouble and an opportunity for renegotiation.”125 Because of credit
default swaps, however, the tendency to favor negotiation of debt
terms when a debtor is facing temporary financial stress may be
dissipating.126 Indeed, if Investor L is better off having Company X
bankrupt (regardless of whether X can recover from its difficult
financial position in the future) and L has the chance to ensure that X
will indeed go bankrupt, why would L even consider sitting down at
the negotiating table to discuss a restructuring?

119 Christopher W. Frost, Bankruptcy Redistributive Policies and the Limits of the Judicial
Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 75, 75 (1995) (“Business failure negatively affects a broad range of
interests.”).
120 Id. at 76.
121 Id.; see also Hu & Black, Governance and Systemic Risk, supra note 100, at 690–693
(discussing that empty creditors are also a source of systemic risk for the economy at large.).
122 Lewis and Einhorn, supra note 28 (“There are [still] tens of trillions of dollars in
[credit-default-swap] contracts between big financial firms.”); Gretchen Morgenson, It’s Time
for Swaps to Lose Their Swagger, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2010, at BU2 (“[T]he Bank for
International Settlements, [found that] credit default swaps with a face value of $36 trillion were
outstanding in the second quarter of 2009.”).
123 Although outside the scope of this Comment, future research may consider how
creditors’ ability to institute bankruptcy proceedings relates to empty creditor syndrome. See
Lubben, supra note 91, at 427 (“Creditors will have every incentive to trigger the swap by filing
an involuntary bankruptcy petition against the debtor, illustrating the important point that
‘bankruptcy’ is the one credit event that can be controlled by credit buyers.”); see also Hemel,
supra note 103, at 164 (citing Lubben for the same proposition).
124 Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 29, at 699.
125 Hu & Black, Debt and Hybrid Decoupling: An Overview, supra note 98, at 8.
126 See supra Part II (discussing stresses on creditors).
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A few commentators have discussed this issue. In particular, one
commentator’s proposal offers a clever starting point for addressing
the specific problem this Comment focuses on: preventing creditdefault-swap holders from forcing companies into bankruptcy by
refusing to engage in restructuring negotiations.127 To truly combat
this phenomenon, however, Congress should take a stronger stand.
A. Other Commentators’ Consideration of Empty Creditor Syndrome
To date, legal academics have paid little attention to the
relationship between empty creditor syndrome and corporate
bankruptcies.128 The majority of those who have commented on this
issue have focused on how credit-default-swap holders affect
companies after those companies have already filed for bankruptcy.129
Their regulatory recommendations address the post-bankruptcy
environment and encourage the disclosure of credit-default-swap
positions.130 For instance, one commentator calls for bankruptcy law
to “require any party seeking to be heard in [a bankruptcy] case to file
an accompanying verified statement setting forth its disclosable
economic interests,” including credit default swaps, under Rule 2019
of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.131 Another calls for
“[t]he Bankruptcy Code” to generally “incorporate a system that
mandates disclosures of short positions in the debtor’s equity or debt,
derivatives or other third party contracts that reduce or eliminate an
investor’s economic risk, as well as interest in major competitors of
the debtor.”132
Similarly, law professors Henry T.C. Hu and Bernard Black, who
have written extensively on empty creditor syndrome, argue that
disclosure “should become a routine part of bankruptcy
proceedings.”133 Additionally, Professors Hu and Black add to the
general call for more disclosure by asserting that:
See generally Hemel, supra note 103.
Kidder, supra note 110, at 805 (“As the credit derivatives market is a relatively recent
and complex phenomenon, its potential implications in the bankruptcy context have received
only limited scholarly attention.”).
129 See, e.g., Lubben, supra note 91 (discussing, generally, how credit default swaps can
impact reorganizations).
130 See Hemel, supra note 103, at 164–67 (surveying previous scholarly solutions to the
empty creditor problem).
131 Kidder, supra note 110, at 839.
132 Kevin J. Coco, Note, Empty Manipulation: Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 2019 and
Ownership Disclosure in Chapter 11 Cases, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 610, 649 (2008); see
also Lubben, supra note 91, at 427 (proclaiming that more disclosure may be necessary to
prevent the negative effects).
133 Hu & Black, Empty Voting II, supra note 91, at 734; see also Hu & Black, Governance
and Systemic Risk, supra note 100, at 684 (arguing for the same).
127

128
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Debt contracts may need to adjust to the new world of hedged
interests, voting rights in bankruptcy may need to be based on
net economic ownership instead of gross ownership of debt,
and the extra complexities in devising sensible voting rules
may provide support for proposals to rely more on
auctions.134
While Congress’s adoption of these proposals may improve the
efficiency of Chapter 11—a laudable goal in its own right135 —
“[c]redit default swaps create a moral hazard problem [both] before
the Chapter 11 begins and in its immediate aftermath.”136 Thus, to
adopt truly meaningful regulatory change, Congress must address the
pre-bankruptcy effects empty creditor syndrome has on companies.
One commentator, Daniel Hemel, has written on this specific
issue.137 To begin, Hemel notes that disclosure requirements, such as
those that advocates of post-bankruptcy reform propose, “would not
necessarily alter the incentives ‘empty creditors’ in pre-bankruptcy
restructuring situations.”138 Second, he contends that, by changing the
language that credit-default-swap agreements typically use, we can
accomplish the goal of altering these incentives to preclude creditdefault-swap holders from causing unnecessary bankruptcies.139
Currently, “[t]he International Swaps and Derivatives Association
(ISDA), a private sector trade association, has crafted a Master
Agreement that governs most credit default swap[s].”140 Hemel
proposes that the ISDA Master Agreement include “a broad definition
of ‘restructuring’” as one of the events that compels a seller of credit
default swaps to pay purchasers.141 Under Hemel’s proposed
language, a restructuring would require credit-default-swap sellers to
pay the swapholder the difference between the face value of the
holder’s stake in the asset being restructured and the value in what the
holder owns after the restructuring.142 Currently, restructurings, such

134 Hu & Black, Empty Voting II, supra note 91, at 735; see also Hu & Black, Governance
and Systemic Risk, supra note 100, at 684 (arguing for the same).
135 After all, “[v]oting by empty creditors in bankruptcy can lead to less efficient decisions
on liquidation versus continuation, or on post-reorganisation capital structures.” Hu & Black,
Governance and Systemic Risk, supra note 100, at 684.
136 Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 29, at 683.
137 Hemel, supra note 103.
138 Id. at 165 (citing Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 29, at 683).
139 Id. at 161.
140 Id. at 162.
141 Id. at 167.
142 Id. at 168.
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as debt exchanges, do not fall under credit-default-swaps standard
language for default, as found in the ISDA Master Agreement.143
If future participants in the credit-default-swap market make the
contractual changes that Hemel proposes, it is clear that the
agreements will remove the incentive for credit-default-swap holders
to force companies into bankruptcy by refusing to negotiate during
restructurings.144 Consider our old friends Investor L, Company X,
and Insurance Firm Z. Initially, Z sold L a credit default swap
insuring L’s investment in X’s bonds. Now assume that the agreement
between L and Z also requires Z to pay L if X restructures its debtequity ratio. What if X, on the verge of bankruptcy, offers its
debtholders a debt-for-equity exchange to strengthen itself moving
forward?
Presumably, the present market value of the equity that Investor L
and Company X’s other bondholders would receive will be less than
the face value of the bonds they own. For example, assume that L’s
bonds have an aggregate face value of $1,000,000, but, if she accepts
X’s proposed exchange, her equity stake will be worth only $500,000.
Under the old credit-default-swap agreements, L would rather receive
the $1,000,000 payout from Insurance Firm Z than stock worth
$500,000. But, under the new terms that Hemel proposes, L is
indifferent. If L accepts X’s restructuring offer, Z must pay her
$500,000—the difference between the $1,000,000 face value of the
bonds and the $500,000 present market value of the equity stake in X.
After Z’s payment and X’s restructuring, L will have $500,000 in
cash and a $500,000 equity stake in X. Thus, L ends up with the same
amount of value she would have had if X went bankrupt. At the point
when L had to decide whether to participate in the restructuring, she
no longer had an incentive to force the company into bankruptcy.145
B. Congress Should Ensure That Credit-Default-Swap Contracts
Remove the Incentive for Credit-Default-Swap Holders to Force
Companies into Early Bankruptcies
Hemel’s proposed change to the contractual language that parties
use in the credit-default-swap market accomplishes the goal of
preventing credit-default-swap holders from forcing companies into
bankruptcy by removing the holders’ incentives to do so. But, to
143 Id. at 162 (citing Jongho Kim, From Vanilla Swaps to Exotic Credit Derivatives: How
to Approach the Interpretation of Credit Events, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 705, 791
(2008)).
144 Id. at 167–69 (outlining his proposed changes).
145 See id. at 167–68 (exploring another hypothetical to explain this point).
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accomplish this, Hemel called for the “[ISDA], a private sector trade
association,”146 to change the definition of default in its standard
credit-default-swap agreement voluntarily.147 The effectiveness of his
proposal, therefore, relies on two uncertain contingencies.
First, the ISDA must voluntarily make the change that Hemel
proposes to its Master Agreement. This seems unlikely given the
ISDA’s response to a lawsuit that turned on whether, under the ISDA
Master Agreement, a company’s restructuring constituted a credit
event requiring the credit-default-swap issuer to pay the purchaser.148
During the case, the “ISDA issued a new set of credit derivatives
definitions” that established that “a ‘voluntary debt exchange [would]
not trigger a credit event.’”149 Additionally, when “the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision . . . considered a rule that would
recognize credit default swaps for regulatory capital purposes only if
the swaps specified ‘restructuring’ as a credit event[,] . . . ISDA
raised concerns . . . .”150
Even if the ISDA changes course and voluntarily makes this
change, a second contingency comes into play: will the parties to
credit default swaps continue to utilize the ISDA Master Agreement
without amending the new definition of credit event? It seems
unlikely that they will. By adding “restructurings” to the list of events
that trigger the credit-default-swap seller’s obligation to pay, the
holder increases the overall number of ways that a seller may have to
make payment. Thus, by including “restructuring,” the purchaser has
increased the likelihood that the seller will be required to make
payment on the swap. If a seller recognizes that he is more likely to
have to make payment later, he will charge more for the swap
upfront.
Some might argue that sellers could begin requiring this language
as a prerequisite for even being willing to offer credit default swaps.
This makes sense at first (consider that Insurance Firm Z is better off
paying $500,000 rather than $1,000,000). As AIG’s actions leading
up to our recent financial crisis show, however, credit-default-swap
sellers may not be that prudent.151 Or, in a more likely scenario,
sellers have simply balanced the value of being able to offer a cheaper
product against the probability that it will result in more costly
Hemel, supra note 103, at 162.
Id. at 167–68.
148 Id. at 162 (citing Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., No. 02
Civ. 1312, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20706 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2002)).
149 Id. (citing Jongho Kim, From Vanilla Swaps to Exotic Credit Derivatives: How To
Approach the Interpretation of Credit Events, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 705, 791 (2008)).
150 Id. at 166.
151 See supra Part I.B–C.
146

147
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payouts and determined that offering credit default swaps without
including this language is advantageous to them. This implies that the
current issuers of credit default swaps are miscalculating the risks
involved to them with empty creditor syndrome (higher than
necessary payouts). After all, it is likely that credit-default-swap
sellers have probably considered these scenarios before this
Comment, and yet they have not required this language in their
offerings. It is not surprising, though, given their inability to
accurately evaluate risk in the past.152
Knowing this, purchasers are also unlikely to demand this change.
After all, why would purchasers voluntarily demand language that
increases their contracts’ cost? They would not, especially when one
realizes that they are indifferent between the protection offered by the
old language and the new language. Indeed, Investor L, as a rational
actor, should not care whether she receives $1,000,000 cash or
$500,000 in cash and $500,000 worth of equity in Company X.153 L,
therefore, will not pay more to receive the latter by requiring that the
credit-default-swap agreement include restructuring as a triggering
event.
Admittedly, the uncertainty of this second contingency could be
eliminated if the parties are forced to include this language. Hemel
addresses this question by pointing to the fact that, because credit
default swaps will be “mov[ing] toward a clearinghouse system,”154
under Dodd-Frank,155 “opportunities to construct customized
contracts will diminish.”156 This is true, Hemel contends, because
clearinghouses may require that credit-default-swap agreements
follow the ISDA Master Agreement.157 At present, however, DoddFrank and the SEC’s subsequent rules have not required
clearinghouses to compel market participants to use the ISDA Master
Agreement.158

See supra Part I.B–C.
The value of the equity is, after all, a cash equivalent.
154 Hemel, supra note 103, at 169.
155 See supra Part I.D.
156 Hemel, supra note 103, at 169.
157 See id. (“The one clearinghouse that is up-and-running in the United States, ICE Trust,
applies the ISDA Master Agreement—with a small number of exceptions—to all swaps that it
clears.”).
158 Dodd-Frank makes no mention of the ISDA, let alone mandating that clearinghouses
require market participants follow its Master Agreement. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010)
(making no mention of the ISDA). Likewise, the SEC, which has regulatory power over
“security-based swap agreements, such as credit default swaps,” has not addressed the issue.
See Derivatives, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, (Dec. 30, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/derivatives.shtml (outlining and linking to the rule
proposals the SEC has made “[a]s of the end of 2011”) (quotations omitted).
152
153
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Furthermore, even if the credit-default-swap market entirely
moves to clearinghouses, it is counterintuitive to assume that all
clearinghouses will require this definition in every credit-defaultswap agreement. Although “[t]he one clearinghouse that is up-andrunning in the United States, ICE Trust, applies the ISDA Master
Agreement—with a small number of exceptions—to all swaps that it
clears,”159 it is highly probable that more clearinghouses will emerge
as the whole credit-default-swap market moves to clearinghouses.
And new clearinghouses may be unlikely to compel parties to abide
by the ISDA Master Agreement. After all, a clearinghouse is simply
interested in ensuring that the purchasers of the swaps make the
required payments and, when an event that triggers an obligation for a
seller to make a payout, the seller does so.160 Adding to the kinds of
events that can trigger such an obligation for the seller may
complicate this role because it introduces another type of event, the
occurrence of which the parties may disagree about. Even if some
clearinghouses do require that restructurings count as a triggering
event, it is unlikely that all will because demand probably exists for
the parties to develop their credit-default-swap contracts freely as
they have been in the over-the-counter market.
Despite the analysis above, there remains another way that
Congress could ensure that the parties adopt the changes that Hemel
proposes: it could mandate that parties engaging in credit default
swaps do so. Unfortunately, this will be politically challenging.
Should the federal government be mandating specific contractual
terms? Even if it theoretically should, will politicians have the
political will to do so? If the political will exists, then Congress
should mandate that a restructuring constitutes an event triggering the
seller’s obligation to make payment to the purchaser in a creditdefault-swap agreement.
It stands to reason, however, that this is an implausible outcome.
Accordingly, this Comment proposes an alternative solution:
Congress should allow a credit-default-swap seller to refuse to make
payment because of a bankruptcy if, prior to that bankruptcy, the
holder does not accept a restructuring offer.161 Congress should adopt
this solution because it will solve the empty creditor problem, and it is
more pragmatic politically. Allowing credit-default-swap sellers to
Hemel, supra note 103, at 169.
See Hui & Kuan, supra note 76, at 3 (discussing the clearing of derivatives contracts).
161 There are many specifics to actually crafting legislation to this effect, e.g., how do we
want to define “restructuring offer”? And who has the burden of proving that the holder refused
a restructuring offer? These issues are beyond the scope of this Comment, but future
commentators should address them.
159

160
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refuse to make payment because of purchasers’ self-interested
insistence on bankruptcy eliminates the financial incentive for holders
to force companies into bankruptcy.
Imagine Company X offers Investor L a debt-for-equity exchange
with this rule in place. Assuming that the parties are operating under
the typical credit-default-swap agreement, L has two options: (1)
accept the offer and receive equity worth half of the face value of his
bonds, or (2) refuse the offer and hope that X does not go bankrupt.
Assume further that the debt-for-equity exchange would have allowed
X to avoid bankruptcy. If X does file for bankruptcy, Insurance Firm
Z need not make the $1,000,000 credit-default-swap payout. Because
the value of bankrupt X’s bonds are likely to be less than the equity
stake that L could have received in the debt-for-equity deal, this
regulation forces L to always take restructuring deals that a company
it invests in offers. Some will argue that this is unfair. But this
Comment’s proposed rule should not prevent the parties from
contracting in a way that allows the credit-default-swap holder to
receive payment upon accepting the restructuring agreement. In other
words, Congress should permit the parties to adopt the type of
contract Hemel advocates for: a deal under which the seller agrees to
pay the purchaser the difference between the value of the purchaser’s
debt/equity holding after a restructuring and the amount the purchaser
would have received under the agreement if the underlying debt
provider had filed for bankruptcy.
If the parties do craft this type of agreement, credit-default-swap
purchasers will protect themselves against the loss associated with
accepting the restructuring deal. This is the type of beneficial hedging
that we want from credit default swaps, but this type of contract will
also protect the companies issuing the underlying debt from
unnecessary bankruptcies.162 In effect, then, this Comment’s proposal
protects companies, yet it allows credit-default-swap sellers and
purchasers to contract in a way that preserves the benefits credit
default swaps provide the market.
After Congress adopts this Comment’s proposed rule, creditdefault-swap purchasers will bargain for the type of contract Hemel
proposes to protect themselves. Either way, credit-default-swap
sellers are better off. First, they are better off because they can avoid a
large payout if the holder forces the underlying company into
bankruptcy, assuming the parties do not adopt the type of contract
Hemel proposes. Second, even if the parties do adopt the type of
contract Hemel proposes, a seller would still be better off because “its
162

See supra Part III.B.
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payout” from a restructuring “would be less than its expected loss in
the absence of such an exchange.”163
Moreover, under this Comment’s rule, credit-default-swap holders
will no longer have an economic incentive to refuse to engage in
restructurings because they will end up with nothing if they do.
Likewise, credit-default-swap purchasers no longer have the incentive
under this proposed rule if the parties adopt the contract Hemel
proposes because the purchaser is indifferent to the company’s
bankruptcy.164 If the credit-default-swap purchasers documented the
contract Hemel proposes, they are not particularly worse off, as their
only loss is paying more for the swap than they otherwise would. And
this makes sense because they are the parties benefitting from empty
creditor syndrome.
Most importantly, the economy at large is better off as it avoids the
negative externalities associated with corporate bankruptcy.165 Some
might argue that this could be a bad outcome because companies in
this situation might be better off in bankruptcy rather than
restructuring. If this were true, then the boards and officers of those
companies, in line with their fiduciary duties to shareholders, would
be required to file for bankruptcy in the first place. Furthermore, even
if the companies do end up filing for bankruptcy later, investors can
still fall back on their credit-default-swap agreements to protect them.
If, for instance, Investor L’s $500,000 post-exchange equity stake in
Company X becomes worthless a few months later because X still
files for bankruptcy, L can look to Insurance Firm Z for that value
under their credit-default-swap agreement.
Another concern that might arise from this Comment’s rule, and
under the type of contract Hemel proposes more generally, is whether
either causes restructurings that would not otherwise occur. This
stems from a belief that, because credit-default-swap holders will
always either (1) be indifferent to—under a Hemel contract—or (2)
prefer to—under this Comment’s proposed rule alone—restructure,
even if it does not make economic sense. Under this perspective, if a
company offering a restructuring knows that its debtholders have
credit-default-swap agreements, it may try to force through a
restructuring that is not necessary to prevent bankruptcy, which will
Hemel, supra note 103, at 168.
See supra Part III.A.
165 See Hemel, supra note 103, at 164 (“[A]n unnecessary bankruptcy causes deadweight
loss on society as a whole.”); see also Yves Smith, Musings on Credit Default Swaps, NAKED
CAPITALISM (Apr. 28, 2009), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2009/04/musings-on-creditdefault-swaps.html (“[N]egotiations can keep companies out of [bankruptcy], and are also
necessary for Chapter 11 to succeed. And if a restructurings fail, more job losses result. This too
is a toll on the real economy.”).
163

164
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naturally harm the credit-default-swap purchasers. Likewise, a creditdefault-swap seller would be troubled by this because, under a Hemel
contract, it would have to make payment for an unnecessary
restructuring.
This concern is overblown, however, because it generally takes
more than one debtholder to accomplish a restructuring. For example,
in Six Flags’ bankruptcy, the company required 95 percent of its
bondholders to agree to the debt-for-equity swap.166 Thus, even if one
large bondholder—such as Fidelity in Six Flags’ case or Investor L in
our ongoing example—approves a restructuring, it will still be
contingent upon independent debtholders agreeing to the deal.
Presumably, the other debt holders will only accept a restructuring if
it is truly in the best interest of the creditors as a whole.167 In this way,
“the interests of the protection seller and those of ‘full creditors’
would be aligned,” meaning that “seller could be (reasonably)
confident that the debt exchange would only occur under
circumstances that reduced its expected payout.”168
If this fact does not offer enough security against the inefficient
outcome,169 credit-default-swap sellers can contract around this
problem. For example, they could require that a credit-default-swap
holder who is approached by an underlying company about a
restructuring notify the seller. The seller could then ensure that the
holder only accept a restructuring that is necessary by requiring that
the holder obtain the seller’s approval or even that the holder allow
the seller to negotiate the restructuring on its behalf. The holder
should not have a problem with this because, under this proposed rule
and a contract following Hemel’s proposal, he is hedged whether the
company takes the restructuring or not. Thus, this Comment’s
proposed rule would not encourage unnecessary restructurings to the
detriment of credit-default-swap sellers.
As this subsection shows, adopting this Comment’s rule.
Additionally, it avoids the problem that Hemel’s proposal suffers
from: relying on voluntary compliance by parties that completely
misinterpreted the risk these derivatives pose in recent years.170 And,
Hemel, supra note 103, at 159.
It is possible that all of the debtholders will own credit default swaps, which would
make this point moot. This does not, however, seem likely, as not all debtholders will be able to
afford credit default swaps.
168 Id. at 168.
169 This also applies if all of the debtholders own credit default swaps, or at least if enough
of them to accept the restructuring do.
170 As noted earlier, “[a]bout 80% of the derivative assets and liabilities carried on the
balance sheets of 100 companies reviewed by Fitch were held by five banks: JP Morgan Chase,
Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, and Morgan Stanley. Those five banks also
166

167
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most importantly, it accomplishes the goal this Comment started off
with: preventing credit-default-swap holders from pushing companies
into premature bankruptcy by refusing to engage in restructuring
negotiations.
CONCLUSION
While “[t]he ultimate impact of the Dodd-Frank Bill on the
derivatives market will depend in large part on the regulations that the
[Commodities Futures Trading Commission] and [Securities
Exchange Commission] promulgate,”171 Congress’s decision not to
address the risk that credit-default-swap owners might have an
incentive to encourage, or force, companies into bankruptcy was a
mistake. Because we can “no longer . . . rel[y] on” the
“assumption . . . that creditors generally want to keep a solvent firm
out of bankruptcy,”172 Congress’s error leaves the regulation of credit
default swaps lacking. As Congress considers ways to increase the
efficacy of Dodd-Frank, it should recognize that an adjustment to the
regulation of the credit-default-swap market to include a protection
against empty creditor syndrome would be valuable for our economy.
Adopting this Comment’s rule would be a wise start.
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